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Background. An outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Jordan in 2015 involved a variant 
virus that acquired distinctive deletions in the accessory open reading frames. We conducted a molecular and seroepidemiologic 
investigation to describe the deletion variant’s transmission patterns and epidemiology.
Methods. We reviewed epidemiologic and medical chart data and analyzed viral genome sequences from respiratory specimens 
of MERS-CoV cases. In early 2016, sera and standardized interviews were obtained from MERS-CoV cases and their contacts. Sera 
were evaluated by nucleocapsid and spike protein enzyme immunoassays and microneutralization.
Results. Among 16 cases, 11 (69%) had health care exposure and 5 (31%) were relatives of a known case; 13 (81%) were symp-
tomatic, and 7 (44%) died. Genome sequencing of MERS-CoV from 13 cases revealed 3 transmissible deletions associated with clin-
ical illness during the outbreak. Deletion variant sequences were epidemiologically clustered and linked to a common transmission 
chain. Interviews and sera were collected from 2 surviving cases, 23 household contacts, and 278 health care contacts; 1 (50%) case, 
2 (9%) household contacts, and 3 (1%) health care contacts tested seropositive.
Conclusions. The MERS-CoV deletion variants retained human-to-human transmissibility and caused clinical illness in infected 
persons despite accumulated mutations. Serology suggested limited transmission beyond that detected during the initial outbreak 
investigation.
Keywords. coronavirus; emerging infectious disease; genome deletion; Jordan; MERS-CoV; Middle East respiratory syndrome; 
outbreak investigation; sero-epidemiology.
 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) 
causes acute respiratory illness that can progress rapidly to 
respiratory failure and death in approximately 35%–40% of 
reported laboratory-confirmed cases [1, 2]. The first known 
cases of MERS-CoV occurred during an outbreak of severe 
acute respiratory infections in Zarqa, Jordan, during March–
April 2012 [3, 4]. Since then, new cases and clusters of MERS-
CoV infections continue to occur within the Arabian Peninsula 
and have been exported to other countries around the world [5].
During August–October 2015, a MERS-CoV outbreak with 
16 laboratory-confirmed cases occurred in hospitals in Amman 
and Zarqa, Jordan. An outbreak investigation was conducted 
by the Jordan Ministry of Health (JMoH), followed by a World 
Health Organization review in September 2015. Sequencing per-
formed by Lamers et al. [6] on samples from 13 outbreak cases 
found the virus to be associated with a novel recombinant clade 
that predominated in Saudi Arabia in 2015 [7] and was exported 
to South Korea and China [8]. Importantly, genetic analysis also 
revealed 2 unique mutations resulting from substantial dele-
tion events—a 48-nucleotide (nt) in-frame deletion in accessory 
open reading frame (ORF) 4a present in sequences from 13 out-
break cases and an additional 9-nt in-frame deletion in ORF3 in 
a subset of case specimens collected later in the outbreak—lead-
ing the authors to conclude that all cases were infected following 
a single introduction of the virus [6]. We conducted an investi-
gation that included additional viral genome and serologic ana-
lysis to describe the transmission patterns and epidemiology of 
MERS-CoV deletion variants during the 2015 Jordan outbreak.
METHODS
The JMoH, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), and Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network 
collaboratively conducted a follow-up investigation of the 2015 
MERS-CoV outbreak in Jordan during March–April 2016. 
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We reviewed outbreak investigation records, conducted key 
informant interviews with clinicians and infection control staff 
at the affected hospitals, and reviewed medical charts of con-
firmed cases. A confirmed MERS case met the World Health 
Organization case definition [9] and was laboratory-confirmed 
at the Jordan Central Public Health Laboratory using MERS-
CoV N2 and/or N3 real-time reverse transcription polymerase 
chain reaction (rRT-PCR) assays [10]. A  case was considered 
health care–associated if they were a patient, visitor, or health 
care personnel (HCP) at a health care facility during the 14 days 
before symptom onset (exposure period), and if exposure to a 
known MERS case occurred exclusively in this setting [11].
To identify previously undetected MERS-CoV infections 
among contacts of confirmed cases, we interviewed and col-
lected sera from health care and household contacts of con-
firmed MERS cases from the 2015 outbreak. Additionally, we 
interviewed and collected sera from available surviving cases. 
Contacts were identified using contact tracing lists developed 
by JMoH and the affected hospitals during the initial outbreak 
investigation. All health care contacts included in the investi-
gation were health care personnel; all household contacts were 
relatives of confirmed cases, although they did not necessarily 
live under the same roof. Standardized interview forms were 
completed, which included questions about types of exposure 
to confirmed cases, symptoms after exposure, occupation, and 
testing for MERS-CoV at the time of the outbreak.
Laboratory Methods
Genome Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis
MERS-CoV rRT-PCR-positive nasopharyngeal swabs, sputum, 
tracheal aspirate, or bronchoalveolar lavage samples from 15 
of the 16 confirmed cases collected during August–September 
2015 were stored at −80°C and shipped to the CDC for molec-
ular analysis. Sample aliquots (200  µL) were extracted on a 
NucliSens EasyMAG (BioMerieux), and 100 µL of total nucleic 
acid was recovered. The specimen extracts were retested by 
MERS-CoV N2 and/or N3 rRT-PCR assays [10], and genome 
sequencing was performed on confirmed positive samples with 
sufficient viral load using previously described primer sets and 
protocol [7].
Nucleotide sequences were aligned using Clustal X, ver. 1.83, 
implemented in BioEdit, ver. 7.2.5. Phylogenetic analyses were 
performed using MrBayes, ver. 3.2.6 [12], under a GTR model 
of nucleotide substitution with 4 categories of γ-distributed rate 
heterogeneity and a proportion of invariant sites (GTR + 4 + I).
Serology
Serum samples collected during March–April 2016 were 
shipped to the CDC for MERS-CoV-specific serum antibody 
testing using MERS-CoV nucleocapsid (N) and spike (S) indi-
rect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and micro-
neutralization (MNT) assays [4, 13, 14]. Sera were considered 
potentially positive when the optical density (OD) values were at 
or above the screening 0.15 cutoff value for N-ELISA or 0.1 for 
S-ELISA. Any serum potentially positive by N- or S-ELISA at a 
screening dilution of 1:400 was subsequently titered with serial 
4-fold dilutions (1:100–1:6400) with OD cutoffs of 0.3 for the N 
and 0.2 for the S-ELISAs to determine end point titer and tested 
by MNT for confirmation. Neutralizing antibodies to MERS-
CoV were detected by MNT assay performed in Biosafety Level 
3 (BSL-3) containment, as previously described [4]. The neutral-
ization titer was defined as the reciprocal of the highest serum 
dilution that completely inhibited the live MERS-CoV-mediated 
cytopathic effect in Vero cells in at least 1 of the 3 triplicate wells.
N- and S-ELISAs were considered positive with reciprocal 
end point titers of 400 or greater. MNT were considered positive 
with reciprocal titers of 20 or greater. MERS-CoV seropositivity 
was defined as having 2 of 3 positive assays, including N-ELISA, 
S-ELISA, and MNT, or positive by MNT alone [14]. Sera inde-
terminate seropositivity was defined as S-ELISA positive, but 
N-ELISA and MNT negative.
Ethics
This investigation was classified by the CDC as a public health 
response to an emerging disease outbreak, and Jordanian 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained. Verbal con-
sent was obtained in Arabic.
RESULTS
During August–October 2015, 16 laboratory-confirmed 
MERS-CoV patients were identified in Jordan. These MERS 
cases received care at 9 hospitals in Jordan, with case clusters 
associated with 3: hospitals A, B, and C. The median patient age 
was 55 years (10 months–78 years), 9 (56%) were male, and 13 
(81%) were symptomatic (Table 1). Seven (44%) patients died, 
all of whom had underlying medical conditions. Eleven (69%) 
cases were health care associated, and 5 (31%) were relatives of 
a known case. Health care–associated cases included 6 hospital 
patients, 3 visitors, and 2 HCP.
Molecular Epidemiology
Respiratory specimens from 15 (94%) of the MERS-CoV-
positive patients were received by the CDC and confirmed pos-
itive by rRT-PCR; 13 specimens representing 11 symptomatic 
and 2 asymptomatic cases had sufficient viral RNA for genome 
sequencing. Phylogenetic analysis of the 13 nearly complete 
genomes (GenBank accession No. MF741825-MF741837) 
and 240 previously published MERS-CoV genomes showed 
well-supported clustering of the Jordan outbreak sequences 
within a previously identified clade defined by a signature 
recombination (Figure  1) [7, 8]. Jordan outbreak sequences 
showed the closest similarity with sequences obtained from 
4 temporally concurrent but epidemiologically unrelated 
human MERS cases from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in August 2015 
(GenBank accession Nos. KU851860–851862 and KU851864), 
which did not possess any deletion mutations [15].
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We confirmed the 48-nt (16-aa) in-frame deletion in ORF4a 
present in all Jordan sequences as well as the tandem 9-nt (3-aa) 
in-frame deletion in ORF3 in sequences from 5 patients (cases 
8, 12, 13, 14, 15) obtained later in the outbreak [6]. Additionally, 
we identified a third 726-nt out-of-frame deletion in ORF4b 
and ORF5 (genome position 26339–27064 based on accession 
number JX869059.2) (Supplementary Table 1) from 2 patients 
(cases 3, 11). In ORF4a, ORF3, and ORF4b, 5 deletions were 
all identified in 2 or more epidemiologically linked patients, 
indicating successful virus transmission. We also identified 5 
additional unique deletions ranging in size from 978 to 1438 
nt variably involving ORF1a, ORF3, ORF4a, ORF4b, and ORF5 
that were only present as mixed variants in individual patients 
(cases 2, 5, 6, 14) without evidence of transmission (Figure 2).
The viral transmission patterns deduced independently 
through the epidemiologic investigation corresponded to the 
grouping of cases by deletions observed in their viral genomes 
(Figure 3). Three hospital clusters were identified; the earliest 
cases occurred at hospital A, and index cases for the hospi-
tal B and C clusters both had epidemiologic links to hospital 
A. The 2 cases with the earliest dates of illness onset (cases 1 
and 2) were both present at the same coronary care unit (CCU) 
in hospital A on a single day (case 1 as a patient and case 2 as 
a visitor); however, no direct contact was documented between 
them. Before the 2015 outbreak involving the MERS-CoV dele-
tion variants, the last identified MERS case in Jordan had been 
8 months earlier, in December 2014. In the 2015 outbreak, cases 
1 and 2 had both recently traveled to Jordan from locations 
on the Arabian Peninsula (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait 
City, Kuwait, respectively). Interestingly, viruses genetically 
similar to the viruses detected in cases 1 and 2 in Jordan, but 
without deletions, were concurrently circulating in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, during the period corresponding to the earliest 
cases in Jordan (August 2015) [15]. Neither case 1 nor case 2 
reported contact with a known MERS-CoV patient, camels, or 
a health care setting outside of Jordan during their exposure 
period. A  review of previous CCU admissions did not reveal 
other likely index case candidates. Genome sequence analysis 
could not definitively identify the antecedent virus. Despite an 
extensive investigation, epidemiologic evidence did not defini-
tively determine which of these 2 cases may have been the index 
case. Subsequently, 3 patients (cases 3, 5, and 6) and 1 visitor 
(case 8) at hospital A were identified as cases. Cases 5 and 6 had 
been admitted in the CCU at hospital A MERS before symp-
tom onset. No cases were identified among HCP at hospital A, 
including from the CCU. The wife of case 3 tested positive (case 
11) shortly after case 3 died; a 726-nt deletion in the ORF4b and 
ORF5 genes was shared between this couple.
The hospital B cluster index case was case 2, who visited a 
relative at hospital A and subsequently became ill with respira-
tory symptoms within 2 days of his last exposure to hospital 
A. Case 2 was admitted to hospital B with severe respiratory 
illness and tested positive for MERS-CoV. His sister, case 
4, was not symptomatic and was tested as a contact. Case 7 
was a patient at hospital B during the period that case 2 was 
admitted. Additionally, 1 patient admitted at hospital B dur-
ing the outbreak period became symptomatic with acute res-
piratory symptoms 10 days after discharge and was diagnosed 
Table 1. Demographics, Exposures, and Outcomes Among Confirmed Cases, Jordan, August–October 2015
Case ID No. Age, y Sex Exposure(s) Symptoms, Y/N
Admitting Hospital for 
MERS Illness Medical Comorbidities Hospital Outcome
1 60 M Hospital A, as patient Y Hospital E DM, HTN, CHD/CHF, 
hypothyroidism
Died
2 38 M Hospital A, as visitor Y Hospital B Smoker Survived
3 76 M Hospital A, as patient Y Hospital A CLL, DM, HTN, CHD Died
4 47 F Sister of case 2 N NA None Survived
5 56 M Hospital A, as patient Y Hospital A DM, HTN, CHD, MV stenosis, 
CKD, hepatitis C
Died
6 73 F Hospital A, as patient Y Hospitals F and Ha DM, HTN, CHD/CHF, atrial 
fibrillation
Survived
7 78 M Hospital B, as patient Y Hospital B Lung cancer, DM, COPD Died
8 53 M Hospital A, as visitor Y Hospital C DM, HTN, CHD, smoker Died
9 7 F Daughter of case 8 N Hospital Ha None Survived
10 0.8 F Granddaughter of case 8 Y Hospital Ha None Survived
11 67 F Wife of case 3 Y Hospital B DM, HTN Survived
12 28 M Hospital C, as HCP Y Hospital C None Survived
13 60 M Hospital C, as visitor Y Hospital D DM, HTN Survived
14 69 F Hospital C, as patient Y Hospital G Breast cancer, CHD/CHF Died
15 38 F Hospital C, as HCP N NA None Survived
16 53 M Brother-in-law of case 13 Y Hospitals I and D Smoker Died
Abbreviations: CHD, chronic heart disease; CHF, congestive heart failure; CKD, chronic kidney disease; CLL, chronic lymphocytic leukemia; DM, diabetes mellitus; F, female; HCP, health care 
personnel; HTN, hypertension; M, male; MV, mitral valve.
aHospital H is the referral hospital for patients with MERS in Amman, Jordan.
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with MERS-CoV after returning home to Saudi Arabia. She 
was not counted among the 16 Jordanian cases. The patient 
had returned to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, just before onset of 
respiratory symptoms and was subsequently hospitalized 
there, transmitting MERS-CoV to an HCP in Jeddah. This 
case was detected during an investigation of otherwise unex-
plained hospital-associated MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia [16] 
and could represent export of the deletion variant virus from 
Jordan to Saudi Arabia; however, sequences were not available 
for confirmation.
The case introducing the deletion variant to hospital C by 
evidence of onset time (case 8)  had visited his daughter at 
hospital A during the period when MERS-CoV patients were 
admitted at hospital A. He became ill approximately 5–6 days 
after visiting hospital A  and was admitted at hospital C for 
care. Subsequently, 1 patient (case 14), 1 visitor (case 13), and 
2 health care personnel (cases 12 and 15)  at hospital C were 
identified with MERS-CoV infection. The 9-nt deletion in the 
ORF3 gene was detected among all identified cases linked to the 
hospital C cluster. The visit of case 8 to hospital A corresponded 
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Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree constructed from near complete Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) genome sequences obtained from the 13 Jordan 
cases, indicated by solid-colored circles, and 240 previously published genome sequences in GenBank using the program MrBayes v3.2.6 [12] under a general time-reversible 
(GTR) model of nucleotide (nt) substitution with 4 categories of γ-distributed rate heterogeneity and a proportion of invariant sites (GTR + 4 + I). Clade-credibility values ≥70% 
are indicated at selected nodes. Circle colors correspond to transmitted deletion mutations: blue indicates 48-nt in-frame deletion in ORF4a; purple indicates 48-nt in-frame 
deletion in ORF4a and tandem 9-nt in-frame deletion in ORF3; and yellow indicates 48-nt in-frame deletion in ORF4a and tandem 726-nt out-of-frame deletion in ORF4b and 
5. Case numbers assigned by the Jordan Ministry of Health are indicated within the circles. The scale bar shows the genetic distance as nt substitutions per site. aFor case 
5, 2 sequence variants were detected: (i) a sequence with the ORF4a deletion only and (ii) a sequence with the ORF3 deletion and a tandem deletion in ORF3, 4a and 4b. Only 
the sequence with the ORF4a deletion is presented.
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temporally with the hospitalization of case 5 at hospital A, 
whose specimen contained 2 genome sequence variants, 1 with 
the ORF4a deletion only and a second with the 9-nt ORF3 dele-
tion noted above and a downstream 1042-nt out-of-frame dele-
tion involving ORF3, 4a, and 4b.
Seroepidemiologic Investigation
Interviews and sera were obtained from 301 contacts of the 16 
confirmed MERS-CoV cases, including 278 health care and 
23 household contacts, as well as 2 surviving confirmed cases 
(Supplementary Table 2). Of the 278 health care contacts, 3 (1%) 
were seropositive and 4 (1%) were serologically indeterminate. 
Seropositive HCP included a nurse, a respiratory therapist, and 
a radiology clerk. Serologically indeterminate HCP included 
2 respiratory therapists, a nurse, and a housekeeper (Table 2). 
The seropositive respiratory therapist reported fever and cough 
within 14 days of exposure to a MERS-CoV patient; all others 
did not report symptoms. The seropositive radiology clerk and 
symptomatic respiratory therapist tested negative for MERS-
CoV by rRT-PCR during the initial outbreak investigation.
Seropositive and serologically indeterminate HCP were 
detected from 3 hospitals: B, C, and D (Table  2). Of the 58 
hospital A  HCP tested, none were seropositive or serologi-
cally indeterminate. At hospitals B and C, health care–associ-
ated transmission was identified at the time of the outbreak; 
at hospital D, where 2 serologically indeterminate HCP were 
detected, health care–associated transmission had not been 
documented. At hospital C, the investigation revealed a sero-
positive respiratory therapist who cared for both case 8 hospital 
C (index case) and case 14, who later developed symptoms after 
hospital discharge. The 2 cases briefly overlapped on the same 
floor, and case 8 immediately preceded case 14 in a particular 
radiology suite; however, no direct contact between the patients 
was reported. Case 15, a nurse at hospital C, also cared for both 
case 8 and case 14, but her suspected onset followed the expos-
ure periods of these cases.
Of the 23 household contacts, 2 (9%) were seropositive and 
an additional 2 (9%) were serologically indeterminate. Reported 
household contact included living in the same household as a 
confirmed MERS-CoV case, caring for the case at home, and 
visiting the case in the hospital (Table  2). One seropositive 
household contact had fever and respiratory symptoms within 
14 days of contact with a confirmed case. All household con-
tacts tested negative for MERS-CoV by rRT-PCR during the 
initial investigation.
Of the 2 surviving confirmed MERS-CoV patients tested, 
1 (50%) was seropositive by MNT (case 12) and 1 was seron-
egative (case 15). Case 12 was a nurse with no comorbidities 
who had severe illness requiring hospitalization. Case 15 
was a nurse with no comorbidities who was documented as 
asymptomatic.
Deleons (∆)
ORF4a (48nt ∆)  
ORF3 (9nt ∆)
ORF3,4a,4b,5 (1438nt ∆)  
ORF3,4a,4b,5 (1159nt ∆)  
ORF3,4a,4b (1042nt ∆)  
ORF4a,4b,5 (978nt ∆)  
ORF4b,5 (726nt ∆)  
ORF1a (1055nt ∆)
1 2 3 4 5 6
8 11 12 13 14 15
7
Figure 2. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) deletion variants detected in individual cases, Jordan 2015. MERS-CoV deletions not drawn to scale. 
Deletion (∆): superscript numbers indicate genome assignment.
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DISCUSSION
The MERS-CoV ORF 4a deletion variant and additional muta-
tions observed over the course of this outbreak, including dele-
tions in ORFs 3, 4b, and 5, were epidemiologically clustered 
in time and space, suggesting a single transmission chain and 
demonstrating human-to-human transmissibility of accumu-
lated deletions during the outbreak. Although all outbreak spec-
imens exhibited the ORF4a deletion, an additional deletion in 
ORF3, which was observed later in the outbreak first reported 
by Lamers et al. [6], was predominantly associated with a cluster 
at a single hospital. Additionally, we observed transmission of a 
unique 726nt deletion spanning ORF4b and ORF5 between a 
husband and wife as well as detection of multiple other deletion 
variants within the same hosts. The overall epidemiology of 
this outbreak, including prominent transmission among health 
care contacts, a less pronounced role of household transmis-
sion, a high case fatality rate (44%), presence of comorbidities 
among fatal cases, and retrospective evidence of asymptom-
atic infections, is all consistent with previous descriptions of 
hospital outbreaks, despite the distinctive genomic variation 
we observed [17, 18]. The genomic variability of this MERS-
CoV deletion virus and the accumulation of genetic mutations 
observed as the outbreak continued, as well as information 
from other recent reports [19, 20], highlight the critical impor-
tance of ongoing contemporaneous molecular and epidemio-
logic surveillance for the persistent emergence of MERS-CoV.
This outbreak was unique in having many deletions detected 
from multiple patients, the accumulation of deletion mutations 
over time, and that these deletion variants retained transmissi-
bility and virulence. The observed deletion mutations allowed 
us to link all outbreak patients to a single originating virus 
(ORF4a) and revealed some degree of transmission direction-
ality in the outbreak. We observed multiple deletion mutations 
of varying size mostly distributed among accessory ORFs of 
the Jordan outbreak viruses. Deletion variants of MERS-CoV 
present as mixed infections with wild-type virus involving the 
ORF5, and E protein genes [20] and spike protein gene [19] 
have been previously reported from patients.
MERS-CoV has 5 group-specific ORFs (3, 4a, 4b, 5, and 
8b) that encode accessory proteins whose functions are not 
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No sequence
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Figure 3. Proposed transmission pathways and epidemiologic curve and for confirmed Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) cases, Jordan, 2015. Transmitted deletion 
variants are indicated by superimposed colored boxes. Box colors correspond to those used for case markers in Figure 1. The epidemiologic curve shows the date of illness 
onset or, for asymptomatic cases, the date of first positive MERS-CoV test. Case patients are indicated by the gray elements; element shape corresponds to the likely site 
of exposure. Case numbers are indicated within the elements, and “SA” indicates a patient detected in Saudi Arabia. A red outline indicates that the patient died. Arrows 
indicate likely epidemiologic links (dashed lines for likely healthcare links and solid lines for household links). For cases which may have overlapped in space or time but 
for which we have insufficient data to confidently propose direction of direct or indirect transmission links, no lines are displayed. *For case 5, 2 sequence variants were 
detected: (i) a sequence with the ORF4a deletion only and (ii) a sequence with the ORF3 deletion and a tandem deletion in ORF3, 4a and 4b.
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fully characterized [21]. Although certain ORFs have been 
shown to be nonessential for virus replication in vitro [22], 
evidence exists that they may play a role in modulation of the 
host innate immune response [23–25]. For example, ORF 4a, 
ORF 4b, and ORF 5 proteins have been shown to be potent 
interferon antagonists [23]. Using an ORF3-5 deleted MERS-
CoV infectious clone, Baric et al. observed increased stimu-
lation of the interferon response in vitro and reduced viral 
replication and pathogenesis in a mouse model, compared 
with a wild-type virus [26]. Although deletions in acces-
sory ORFs hypothetically could modulate the host response 
during infection, no apparent changes in pathogenicity were 
observed during our investigation; variant viruses with dele-
tions in ORF 4a, ORFs 3, and 4a, and ORFs 4a, 4b, 5 each 
resulted in symptomatic illness and death in some cases. The 
ORF 4a deletion we observed is in-frame and located within 
the dsRNA-binding domain. The impact on the functional-
ity of the protein with the deletion is unknown and warrants 
future study. Notably, deletions in accessory ORFs were also 
observed in SARS-CoV after its introduction to human hosts, 
and viruses containing a specific ORF 8 deletion were pre-
dominant later in the SARS epidemic [25, 27]. Viral genomic 
changes may have arisen due to selective pressures exerted by 
the human host, or due to the lack of such pressures on genes 
that are required specifically for sustained replication in cam-
els, as suggested by Lamers et al. [6].
The combination of serologic and epidemiologic data 
improved our understanding of viral transmission patterns, 
including a seropositive HCP that may have been the link 
between 2 patient cases. We found that the majority of seropos-
itive or indeterminate HCP were either respiratory therapists or 
nurses, demonstrating risks for these occupations in outbreak 
settings [28]. We also identified a nonclinical HCP (radiology 
clerk) who was seropositive. Infection among nonclinical HCP 
has been less commonly reported; however, these findings high-
light the importance of including nonclinical HCP in contact 
tracing and monitoring efforts and the need to further evaluate 
specific health care activities associated with risk of MERS-CoV 
transmission.
Previous studies on MERS-CoV antibody kinetics suggest 
that serologic investigations might underestimate mild and 
asymptomatic infections [29]. Individuals with mild or asymp-
tomatic infection appear to less reliably develop a detectable 
antibody response after infection, although antibodies have 
been observed to persist for nearly 3  years after infection in 
even young persons without significant comorbidities [13, 
29–31]. In our seroepidemiologic investigation, we found that 
case 15, a mildly ill, rRT-PCR- and sequence-confirmed MERS 
Table 2. Characteristics and Exposures of Seropositive and Serologically Indeterminate Health Care and Household Contacts of 
Confirmed MERS-CoV Cases, Jordan, March–April 2016
ID
Serology Results
(Reciprocal Titers)
N-ELISA S-ELISA 
MNT
Serology 
Interpretation
Case 
Contact
Occupation or 
Relationship to 
Case
Location of 
Exposure(s) Age, y Sex Symptomsa
Medical
Comorbidities
MERS-CoV 
RT-PCR Test 
During Outbreak 
Investigationb
Health care contacts
HC-1 1600 1600 40 Seropositive 2 Nurse Hospital B 24 M None Smoker No
HC-2 1600 1600 <20 Seropositive 8, 14 Respiratory 
therapist
Hospital C 49 M Fever, nonproductive 
cough
Smoker Yes; negative
HC-3 1600 1600 <20 Seropositive 12 Radiology clerk Hospital C 30 F None Smoker Yes; negative
HC-4 <100 400 <20 Indeterminate 8, 12, 14 Respiratory 
therapist
Hospital C 25 M None Smoker No
HC-5 <100 400 <20 Indeterminate 13, 16 Nurse Hospital D 31 M None Smoker No
HC-6 <100 400 <20 Indeterminate 13, 16 Respiratory 
therapist
Hospital D 47 M None DM, smoker No
HC-7 <100 400 <20 Indeterminate 2, 11 Housekeeper Hospital B 33 F None Pregnant No
Household contacts
HH-1 100 400 40 Seropositive 1 Brother Visited in 
hospital
63 M None DM, HTN, 
smoker
Yes; negative
HH-2 1600 1600 40 Seropositive 2, 4 Sister Visited in 
hospital
43 F Fever, rhinorrhea, 
sore throat, SOB
None Yes; negative
HH-3 100 400 <20 Indeterminate 16 Son Visited in hospital, 
cared for at 
home
30 M None Smoker Yes; negative
HH-4 <100 400 <20 Indeterminate 12 Niece Lived in same 
household
4 F None None Yes; negative
Abbreviations: DM, diabetes mellitus; HC, health care; HH, household; HTN, hypertension; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; MNT, microneutralization assay; 
N-ELISA, nucleocapsid protein enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction; S-ELISA, spike protein enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; 
SOB, shortness of breath.
aReported symptoms within 14 days of exposure to a confirmed case.
bSelf-report; positive responses were confirmed using records from the Jordan Ministry of Health; timing of testing in relation to last exposure to confirmed cases unknown.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ofid/article-abstract/5/5/ofy095/4989859 by Erasm
us U
niversity R
otterdam
 user on 01 N
ovem
ber 2018
8 • OFID • Payne et al
case at the time of the outbreak, tested seronegative approxi-
mately 7  months later. Conversely, we identified individuals 
who reported no symptoms and tested MERS-CoV negative 
during outbreak contact tracing but were subsequently sero-
positive. Several exposed individuals had detectable anti-
MERS-CoV S-serum antibodies by ELISA, including 1 who 
exhibited acute respiratory symptoms but did not have detect-
able neutralizing serum antibodies (serologic result classified as 
indeterminate). These individuals may have developed anti-S 
antibodies to non-neutralizing epitopes, neutralizing antibod-
ies may have decayed to below detectable levels at the time we 
collected the sera (~8 months after infection), or they may have 
never mounted robust antibody responses during the initial 
acute infection. The natural history of the immune response to 
MERS-CoV infection as related to disease severity needs fur-
ther investigation. The role of mildly ill or asymptomatic indi-
viduals in transmission of MERS-CoV remains a particularly 
critical question in health care settings where patients with 
underlying conditions might be at increased risk for infection.
Direct epidemiologic links between some health care–asso-
ciated cases could not be established. In addition to potentially 
unrecognized human cases, indirect contact or fomite trans-
mission in this outbreak also remains a possibility. Although 
contamination of environmental surfaces is a suspected mode 
of transmission for some respiratory viruses in certain settings 
[32], this has not been confirmed as a route of transmission for 
MERS-CoV. Key informant interviews with hospital infection 
control officers and clinicians working during the outbreak, as 
well as hygienic observations during the investigation, suggest 
that patients admitted before MERS-CoV was recognized could 
have contaminated shared hospital equipment with transmissi-
ble virus (specifically, an x-ray table and portable echocardio-
gram machine). Viable MERS-CoV has been recovered from 
surfaces after 48 hours at 20°C and 40% relative humidity [33], 
suggesting plausibility that MERS-CoV survives on indoor sur-
faces in a climate-controlled setting. Viral contamination of 
commonly handled surfaces in a hospital setting was reported 
during the 2015 South Korea outbreak [34, 35]. The impor-
tance of fomite transmission compared with other transmission 
routes in nosocomial outbreaks of MERS-CoV remains uncer-
tain but could have important implications for infection pre-
vention and control guidance.
Our investigation had several limitations. The seroepide-
miologic study was conducted 6–8 months after the outbreak, 
and seropositive individuals having antibody titers wane below 
detectable levels might have been missed. Additionally, we were 
conservative in the interpretation of indeterminate serology 
results as this result could represent cross-reactivity or a partial 
or waning immune response. We did not capture all health care 
and household contacts in our seroepidemiologic investigation, 
and we are unable to assess whether those captured were similar 
to those not captured. An overall limitation of the MERS-CoV 
outbreak investigation is that RT-PCR testing of contacts might 
miss cases depending on the timing of nasopharyngeal swab 
swab collection. The Sanger sequencing method used in our 
study may not have detected sequence variants (small deletions 
or insertions or single base polymorphisms) present at low lev-
els in the samples and therefore likely underestimates the com-
plexity of the virus populations present.
In conclusion, we found that the epidemiology of a MERS-
CoV deletion variant did not appear to deviate substantially from 
previous MERS-CoV outbreaks that did not exhibit these muta-
tions. Our investigation revealed that the MERS cases and clusters 
detected in multiple hospitals were all linked to a common trans-
mission chain with a single introduction event. The juxtaposition 
of molecular, serologic, and epidemiologic data revealed that the 
ORF4a genetic deletion and additional deletions observed over 
the course of the outbreak were epidemiologically clustered, yield-
ing an important approach for using molecular information to 
support epidemiological findings and strengthen our understand-
ing of MERS-CoV transmission. Close monitoring of MERS-CoV 
genomic variation [19] and the epidemiology of infection remains 
critical amidst continued reporting of sporadic cases and out-
breaks of MERS-CoV on the Arabian Peninsula.
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